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ORDERS ISSUED IN UNITED STATES V. CITY OF HOPEWELL
In orders dated 26 November 1980 and 4 December 1980 in the United States v.
City of Hopewell, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia dismissed a complaint against Continental Forest Industries, Inc. (CFI)
that they had discharged excessive quantities of pollutants into the Hopewell (POTW)
and dismissed the Commonwealth of Virginia as a party plaintiff to the suit and
joined them as a party defendant.
At the initiation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the United
States had filed a complaint against the City of Hopewell, Va., and two industrial
concerns, CFI and Hercules, Inc., for violations of EPA regulations pertaining to
the discharge of waste into POTWs. The Commonwealth joined the action as a party
plaintiff against the City of Hopewell,
In the 26 November order, the Court discussed the applicability of the various
regulations to CFI. The EPA contends that although 40 C.F.R. 8 4030.14 promulgates
specific regulations applicable to unbleached kraft paper mills, the type of facil-
ity operated by CFI, and CFI's discharges do not violate 40 C.F.R. 8 430.14, CFI
must also comply with the more general provisions of 40 C.F.R. 8 430.5 and,
40 C.F.R. a 128.131, which prohibit discharge of wasts into a POTW which '.... shall-
"inhibit or interfere with the operation or performance of the works." The Court
held that the EPA interpretation of the regulations under which an industry can be-
in compliance with specific discharge tables but violate generalized language in
another regulation "is strained, contrary to logic and reason, contrary to the
general rules of statutory construction, and, if credited, in all likelihood renders
the regulations unconstitutional." The more logical interpretation is that the
specific limitations of 40 C.F.R. 1 430.14 are the "administratively determined
numerical limit on discharges which 40 C.F.R. 1 128.131 and 40 C.F.R. 1 430.5
require."
In the 4 December order the Court agrees with the Commonwealth "that 33 U.S.C
1319(e) requires that the Commonwealth 'be joined as a party,'. whenever a munici-
al subdivision is sued by the United States under any of the provisions of 33 USC
1319," but not as a party plaintiff. That provision of the statute is intended
to make "the State liable for any judgment or expenses a municipality is prevented
by State law from being able to pay." Consequently, the appropriate posture is for
the state to be joined as a defendant. If the Commonwealth wants to take action
against the city, the appropriate place to file the action is in.its own courts.
The Court rejected arguments that the Commonwealth should be able to sue in Federal
court as a "citizen" or that pendant party jurisdiction should be asserted by the
Court.
J.M.J.
